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THE CONSTITUTION OUTSIDE THE COURTS* 
Michael J. Gerhardt** 
Fifteen years ago, Attorney General Edwin Meese gave a speech that sent 
shockwaves through the legal community. In the speech, Meese boldly claimed that 
the Supreme Court was not the final arbiter of constitutional meaning. He suggested 
there was a distinction between the Constitution, which was the supreme law of the 
land, and the Supreme Court's pronouncements on it, which were not. He 
explained, "If the Court's decisions really were the supreme law of the land, binding 
on all persons and governmental entities, including the Court itself, the Court would 
not be able to change its mind," and we would all be forced permanently to abide by 
the Court's "derelicts," such as Dred Scott v. Sanford, until or unless they were 
overturned by a constitutional amendment. Meese also acknowledged that the Court 
was not the only institution responsible for interpreting the Constitution: "[E]very 
official takes an oath precisely to" the same "effect." Meese's speech was widely 
viewed as a surprising assault on judicial supremacy-the Court's authority as the 
final arbiter of constitutional meaning-and consequently drew heated protests, 
including a rejoinder from Associate Justice William Brennan. 
Fifteen years later, Meese's attack on judicial supremacy might seem to some 
as antiquated, quaint, perhaps irrelevant, and maybe even obvious. To others, it 
might be sacreligious. Fifteen years later, it might also seem ironic. For the debate 
over judicial supremacy persists with one major difference being that the parties 
have switched sides. Many scholars who defended judicial supremacy fifteen years 
ago now decry it, while many people who had defended Meese have stood silently 
by in a period in which the Court has tempted its critics by striking down nearly 
thirty federal laws in six years. The fact is that judicial supremacy is not a view 
unique to either liberals or conservatives. Our views on judicial supremacy seem to 
be inextricably linked to the extent of our agreement with the Court's reasoning, 
rulings, and direction. 
• Professor Michael J. Gerhardt delivered this speech at Drake Law School on September 
26, 2002, as part of the Drake Constitutional Law Center Distinguished Speaker Series. Portions of the 
speech were previously published in the Montana Law Review, and are reprinted here with the express 
permission of the Montana Law Review. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Crisis and Constitutionalism, 63 
MONT. L. REv. 277 (2002). 
•• Arthur B. Hanson Chair in Constitutional Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law. 
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My purpose today is to consider what, if anything, has changed since Meese's 
speech, particularly with respect to our views on judicial supremacy and the 
Constitution outside the Court? Some things are clear. It is certainly true that in the 
fifteen years after Attorney Gerieral Meese's speech, we have had a considerable 
number of political developments and controversies: We have had four Presidents, 
replaced six justices on the Supreme Court, impeached and acquitted for only the 
second time in our history a President of the United States, watched the Supreme 
Court for the first time help to resolve a contested presidential election, had four 
very contentious confirmation proceedings on four nominees to the Supreme Court 
(including one rejected by the Senate, another forced to withdraw his nomination, 
yet another confirmed by the closest vote in the history of Supreme Court 
confirmations, and one other confirmed as Chief Justice by the closest vote ever for 
a successful nominee to the chief justiceship), had dozens of judicial nominees who 
had their appointments frustrated or impeded by a variety of actions in the United 
States Senate, added a new amendment to the United States Constitution, endured 
the most devastating domestic terrorist attack in our history, and have been engaged 
in two wars in the Middle East, with one more on the horizon. While these 
developments clearly support Meese's point-twenty of the twenty-one events to 
which I have referred involved critical constitutional decision making outside the 
Supreme Court-we have yet to assess just how either the notion of the Constitution 
outside the Court or Meese's target-judicial supremacy-has fared in the 
intervening period. The time is overdue to consider how the debate over judicial 
supremacy has evolved over the past fifteen years. How have our attitudes about 
either the Court or about the Constitution outside the Court changed? What have we 
learned about the great questions Meese dramatically discussed fifteen years ago? 
These questions lead me tonight to consider several themes that have 
developed over the years relating to the evolution of our understanding of the 
Constitution outside the Courts. Each sheds important light on both the significance 
of constitutional interpretation by actors other than the Court and the state of 
contemporary constitutional theory. 
First, we persist, for good reason, in having the United States Supreme Court 
as the institution we most closely associate with the Constitution. One reason is that 
no other institution seems to speak so regularly about constitutional matters as does 
the Court. It is not just that we have several hundred volumes of Supreme Court 
commentary on the Constitution. It is also that, as Attorney General Meese 
recognized, "the Court is the only branch that routinely, day in and day out, is 
charged with the awesome task of addressing the most basic and enduring political 
questions: What is due process of law? How does the idea of separation of powers 
affect the Congress in certain circumstances? And so forth." Others might go 
further to suggest that the Court as an institution is better able to make principled 
judgments about the Constitution than any of the other branches. Its members 
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reputedly have more time and expertise and more incentive to be impartial in 
addressing the great questions of constitutional law. They are insulated from direct 
political pressures because they have life tenure and are guaranteed undiminished 
compensation, and their duty is, in John Marshall's famous words, "to say what the 
law is." And if the law in question happens to be the Constitution, then it of course 
follows the Court has the duty to say what it means in any cases that fall properly 
within its jurisdiction. 
Second, the fixation of our legal culture on the Supreme Court comes at a 
price, particularly the failure of legal scholars and perhaps the general public to still 
not consider very seriously how much and how well the other branches (and even 
state governments) deal with the Constitution. It is hard to overstate the range or 
significance of constitutional decision making that occurs outside the Court. To be 
sure, Attorney General Meese mentioned a couple of the more dramatic moments in 
our history in which presidents made critical constitutional pronouncements. In 
particular, he mentioned one ofthe most famous of these instances from our early 
history when President Andrew Jackson vetoed the Second National Bank. Even 
though the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the National Bank, 
President Jackson maintained both that Supreme Court precedent should not be 
confused with the Constitution and that as President he too had a responsibility to 
assert his constitutional views. President Jackson proclaimed: 
Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded 
as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the acquiescence of 
the people and the States can be considered as well settled. [Moreover,] the 
opinion of the Supreme Court . . . ought not to control the coordinate 
authorities of this Government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court 
must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each 
public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will 
support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others ... The 
opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of 
Congress has over the judges, and on that the President is independent ofboth. 
The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control 
the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to 
have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve. 
It is not an exaggeration, I think, to say that every subsequent president has agreed 
with Jackson on the independent authority and responsibility of the President to 
interpret the Constitution. 
Attorney General Meese did not mention the after effects of President 
Jackson's famous veto. It sent shockwaves through the political system, and 
triggered a series of other constitutional judgments outside the Court. To begin 
with, Jackson's veto succeeded in killing off the rechartering ofthe National Bank; 
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however, he still had to deal with the fact that the National Bank had a couple more 
years to operate under its initial charter. Consequently, Jackson undertook unilateral 
action to kill the Bank. He instructed his Secretary of the Treasury, William Duane, 
to remove all of the deposits from the National Bank and deposit them in state 
banks. Duane refused. He had concerns about the legality of the President's order. 
So, Jackson fired Duane, taking a finn stand on an unresolved constitutional issue 
about the President's authority to remove unilaterally an official confinned by the 
Senate. Jackson, never one to back down, did not stop there. He asked his then-
Attorney General, Roger Taney, to take over Duane's responsibilities as Treasury 
Secretary. Taney agreed, and wasted no time in implementing Jackson's plan to 
transfer National Bank deposits to state banks. Many senators were outraged. They 
retaliated against Jackson and Taney in several ways. They passed the first and only 
censure resolution ever against a president to denounce Jackson for trying to destroy 
the National Bank, which of course owed its existence to previously passed 
legislation and the Court's imprimatur. Jackson scoffed at the censure resolution, 
maintaining that if he had truly done something illegal, the proper remedy was to 
impeach and remove him from office, something he knew that the Congress lacked 
the fortitude and votes to accomplish. Meanwhile, the Senate rejected Taney's 
nomination as Treasury Secretary based in part on disagreements with the 
legitimacy ofhis implementation ofJackson's order. For good measure, the Senate 
rejected Taney's subsequent nomination to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court. When the dust finally began to settle, the Senate, under new leadership, 
expunged the censure resolution and affirmed Taney's nomination as Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court. 
The extraordinary battle over the National Bank was only one of many 
significant constitutional debates outside the Court that occurred in the nineteenth 
century. At the risk of trying your patience, I note only a few of the more heated 
disputes. For instance, during the presidency of Thomas Jefferson there were 
constitutional challenges over the continued legitimacy of the Alien and Sedition 
Act, the impeachment of Federalist judges, including Associate Justice Samuel 
Chase, efforts to abolish recently created circuit courts, Aaron Burr's treason trial, 
battles with the Tripoli pirates, the Louisiana Purchase, and the legitimacy of a 
presidential trade embargo authorized by statute. In addition, the Constitution was 
amended to include the only constitutional amendment passed between Jefferson's 
presidency and the end of the Civil War, namely, the Twelfth Amendment, which 
had been ratified to fix a defect in the presidential electoral process that had forced 
the House of Representatives to confinn Jefferson's election as President. Other 
constitutional controversies continued apace under Jefferson's successors through 
the first half of the century, as the nation faced the War of 1812; the Missouri 
Compromise and the Kansas-Nebraska Act (both raising serious questions about 
Congress's authority to condition admission of states on measures that it could not 
impose directly); the set of internal improvements dubbed ''the American system" 
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(which were Henry Clay's aggressive legislative program to promote a stronger and 
more integrated national economy); continued disputes over Congress's authority to 
condition the entry of new states into the Union; and the war against Mexico. In a 
wonderful new book on this period, David Currie suggests: 
Look not to the judges, who, like blossoms at the whim of the capricious 
butterfly, pollinate the constitutional fields now and then according to the 
vagaries of litigation. [Instead, g]o to school ... with Presidents, with Cabinet 
ministers, with members of Congress, who grapple with constitutional 
conundrums every day, in every action they contemplate, in every exercise of 
their official function. 
Of course, constitutional decision making outside the Court hardly ended 
there. We are probably all familiar with the constitutional challenges during the 
Civil War period, including the President's inherent authority to take extreme 
measures to counter a domestic emergency, such as unilaterally suspending habeas 
corpus and deploying and managing Union forces in the absence of a formal 
declaration of war. There was also of course Reconstruction, including hard 
questions about whether (and how) the Southern states might have to be readmitted 
into the Union and the conditions, if any, under which to recognize the legitimacy of 
Southern governments; Congress's authority to pass progressive civil rights 
legislation under the Thirteenth Amendment; the proper scope and substance of both 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; the impeachment and trial of a President 
of the United States for not complying with a Jaw passed over his veto, one that he 
considered to be unconstitutional; the legitimacy of using special prosecutors to 
investigate and prosecute corrupt officials in the Grant Administration; the Electoral 
Crisis of 1876; the assassinations oftwo presidents-Abraham Lincoln and James 
Garfield; the necessity and legitimacy of Civil Service Reform; economic 
depression; and national authority over territories owned by the United States. 
Things hardly died down during the first three-quarters of the twentieth 
century. The list is practically endless, but includes, among many other things, two 
world wars, three presidential assassinations (as well as the premature death of 
another president early in his term), another national depression, the fashioning of a 
national economic recovery program, mass industrialization, several undeclared 
wars, several controversial treaties negotiated by but rejected by the Senate, the 
appointments of seven chief justices of the Supreme Court, the rise of the civil rights 
movement, women's suffrage, the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment, the 
addition of eleven new amendments to the Constitution, the rejection of three 
nominees to the Supreme Court, the development of unilateral executive 
agreements, and the forced resignations of one Supreme Court Justice and a 
President of the United States. In these and many other matters, the Court played no 
role; the critical constitutional judgments were made outside the Court. These are 
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just the tip of the iceberg, for there have been other actions throughout this period, 
as was the case throughout the nineteenth century, when presidents and members of 
Congress have made constitutional judgments, including but not limited to 
presidents' pardon decisions, presidents' proposing national legislation, presidents' 
vetoing legislation, the deliberations of members of Congress over the standards for 
impeachment and removal, representatives' and senators' votes for and against 
legislation, presidents' negotiating treaties, senators' determining whether to ratify 
treaties, presidents' standards for nominations, senators' determinations of the 
standards for confirmation, presidents' standards for removing executive officials, 
the Congress's standards for approving international agreements made by means 
other than treaties, presidents' under-enforcement of federal laws and executive 
orders, the Congress's decisions on how to discipline its own members for their 
misconduct in office, and the uses of military force without declarations of war. 
The third theme to consider in the aftermath of Meese's speech is the 
significance of all this constitutional decision making outside the Court. A question, 
long ignored by theorists, is how to evaluate the constitutional decision making of 
the other branches. Here, I want to offer a few different frameworks within which to 
evaluate such decision making. The first is to place such decision making within 
one of three categories-the first is decision making that is subject to judicial 
review, the second is decision making not subject to judicial review, and the third is 
decision making to which the courts show great deference. In the first category, 
members of Congress and the President recognize judicial precedents as persuasive 
authority, but do not necessarily loosen their commitment to interpreting the 
Constitution as each sees fit. In this category, it is important to recognize that the 
choice about following judicial precedent is, in my judgment, a pragmatic one. The 
question is not necessarily whether political authorities must proceed, but the 
choices members of Congress make on how to expend their resources given the 
likelihood of a conflict with the courts. Take, for instance, the congressional 
response to the Court's decision in the late 1980s to strike down a Texas statute 
prohibiting the burning of the American flag. The conventional wisdom is that 
Congress passed a statute knowing that it would be struck down by the Court, and 
thus only did so to pander to its constituents with the knowledge that there was no 
real risk the statute would ever become law. I think the conventional wisdom gets it 
wrong. It is equally, if not more plausible, that members of Congress asserted their 
own views on the First Amendment. They had every right to disagree with the 
Court's judgment on the extent to which the First Amendment protected flag 
burning and acted accordingly. In so acting, the members of Congress demonstrated 
an important dynamic in our constitutional system in which they are responding to 
the Court and working towards change in constitutional law. 
In each of these three categories, but especially the second one, we can see 
presidents and members of Congress develop their own methods of interpreting the 
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Constitution. These methods are not necessarily the same as courts use, but in my 
view they are no less legitimate. For instance, the practice of each institution not 
just to take Supreme Court precedent as persuasive authority, but .also to develop 
their own precedents or traditions. In practice, one finds that presidents and 
members of Congress have not restricted themselves strictly to a single source, such 
as original understanding. Instead, presidents and members of Congress have 
treated evolving practice and custom as a significant source of constitutional 
meaning. For instance, James Madison as President justified supporting the 
National Bank precisely on the ground that three decades of acceptance had 
rendered the institution legitimate. The practice followed by Madison and several of 
the other framers, such as Alexander Hamilton, was to make constitutional 
judgments based on history, but not strictly the framers' and ratifiers' original 
understanding. To the contrary, their approach was, as my friend Marty Flaherty 
describes it, "experiential." He explains that, before Madison, Hamilton had 
extolled this method, urging in The Federalist Papers, "Let experience, the least 
fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these 
[constitutional] questions." Hamilton illustrated what he meant by seeking to 
distinguish relevant historical successes from failures in surveying how almost a 
dozen different jurisdictions, foreign and domestic, modem and ancient, had dealt 
with similar questions. 
The third category is perhaps best exemplified by the current war on 
terrorism. Just as courts played no significant role in resolving the political and 
constitutional questions triggered by the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian GulfWars, 
the odds are they will not play a decisive role in shaping the Administration's 
antiterrorism initiatives and measures. While there have been some lower court 
decisions challenging some of the policies of the Administration to maintain secrecy 
in some areas (such as immigration hearings) for the sake of protecting national 
security, none of them comes anywhere close to the heart of the Administration's 
agenda. Instead, the antiterrorist measures enacted by Congress and implemented by 
the President have each followed critical constitutional judgments by the leaders of 
both branches on the scope of the authority ofboth Congress and the President to 
thwart domestic terrorist activities. In reaching these judgments, our leaders again 
have not looked to original understanding, but rather to our national experiences 
with arguably similar threats in the past. They have searched for reliable evidence 
of our traditions in the face of domestic threats to our national security, whether they 
arise in declared wars such as World War II or undeclared wars such as the Civil 
War. 
Beyond these categories, we can measure the impact of constitutional decision 
making outside the Court on the development of constitutional law. One, often 
under appreciated fact is how much the Court depends on the support of the other 
branches to solve crises in constitutional law. Indeed, the Court has never resolved a 
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genuine crisis in constitutional law without the help or support of the other branches. 
To appreciate the significance of the political branches to the implementation 
of the Constitution, one should consider how different crises in constitutional law 
are handled. The first to consider is a judicial crisis, which arises not when there is a 
conflict between the Court and political authorities, but when political authorities 
persistently refuse to follow and to retaliate against the Court's answer to a question 
of constitutional meaning. Under this definition there have been remarkably few 
genuine judicial crises. Many episodes commonly thought to constitute crises fall 
short. For instance, the first time the Court exercised judicial review to strike down 
a state law-Chisholm v. Georgia-was so unpopular that it took literally a matter 
of days for the decision to be overturned by a constitutional amendment. While the 
Chisholm decision provoked some controversy, the controversy subsided almost as 
quickly as it arose. 
A better candidate for a genuine judicial crisis is the resistance to, and 
retaliation against, the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education I. The 
Southern Manifesto, and other acts of defiance and protest, followed almost 
immediately after the decision came down. The defiance persisted throughout most 
of the 1960s, until the President and Congress decisively sided with the Court 
through the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other progressive civil rights 
measures. 
Another popular candidate for a judicial crisis is the conflict generated by the 
Supreme Court's propensity to protect economic liberties and property rights in the 
first few decades of the twentieth century. This period covers both the Lochner era 
and the New Deal era. In the Lochner era, or the period from 1893 to 1924, 
Congress considered twenty proposals to curb the federal courts' jurisdiction in 
retaliation against the Court's perceived activism. In the remarkably brief period 
from 1935 to 1937, Congress considered thirty-seven bills proposing to curb the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. During his first term, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and other Democrats publicly criticized the Court's rulings striking down 
several New Deal measures. By 1936, as Michael Klarman suggests, "both 
Democrats and Republicans endorsed state minimum wage legislation, and thus [the 
Court's decision in Morehead v. New York ex rei. Tipaldo] incited a firestorm of 
criticism." That decision was the proximate cause of Roosevelt's infamous Court-
Packing Plan, which was the most notorious of the many assaults undertaken at the 
time against the Court. Though the proposal failed, constitutional scholars to this 
day still debate the significance of this failure and its connection to the Court's 
purported "switch in time." 
Yet another possible judicial crisis has been engendered by Roe v. Wade. The 
nation remains divided in its agreement with the fundamental rule announced in the 
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case, and several presidents-Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. 
Bush-openly campaigned against the decision and purposely nominated as judges 
people who were opposed to the decision. To this day, Republican and Democratic 
presidents make choices of judicial nominees based to a significant degree on their 
attitudes about the legitimacy of Roe. The persistence of the relevance of Roe to 
judicial selection indicates the extent to which the political discord engendered by 
the decision still rages. 
A second kind of crisis is political. I submit a political crisis arises when 
political authorities are fighting amongst themselves for supremacy over a particular 
domain ofpolicymaking. Prime examples of political crises (of varying intensity) 
are the set of presidential impeachments, beginning with Andrew Johnson and 
including Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton. In the first of these instances, Congress 
and the President were plainly in a contest for supremacy in dictating Reconstruction 
policy. Interestingly, Johnson was not the first President to have been threatened 
with impeachment because of his overzealous use of the veto (and efforts to assert 
his will over domestic policymaking), but he was the first to be impeached, and thus 
to face removal for his understanding and deployment of the prerogatives of his 
office. As one can see, the magnitude of the crisis seems to have diminished with 
each of the episodes, so the greatest controversy arises with Johnson because of the 
great stakes involving the balance of power, followed by the serious conflict 
between Nixon and Congress culminating in his resignation, and the more tepid 
conflict-tepid, i.e., by relative comparison-of the Clinton impeachment ordeal. 
The third kind of crisis is constitutional. I understand a constitutional crisis to 
arise when conflicting authorities recognize the limits of the Constitution, i.e., when 
contending authorities find or acknowledge that the Constitution provides no answer 
to the controversy at hand. A constitutional crisis is not necessarily the result of the 
joining of judicial and political crises. A constitutional crisis is not just a serious 
conflict among the leaders of national political institutions, or between the courts 
and the political branches, but rather a special circumstance in which political 
leaders recognize that the Constitution provides no guidance and no adequate 
process for resolving the political crisis at hand. 
Where have we seen such crises? I suggest two examples here. The first is 
that slavery precipitated a political crisis that ultimately transformed into a 
constitutional crisis when the Southern states seceded from the Union. Secession 
presented the President and the Congress with a problem for which the Constitution 
had no answer. It came about in part because of the President's and Congress's 
refusal to back down in trying to contain or get rid of slavery in spite of Dred Scott 
v. Sandford. Hence, Dred Scott precipitated a judicial crisis that helped to transform 
an ongoing political crisis over slavery into the constitutional crisis of secession. I 
do not think Dred Scott, standing alone, constituted a constitutional crisis, because 
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political authorities who disagreed with it were not unfamiliar with how to deal with 
constitutional decisions with which they disagreed. Lincoln, for instance, simply 
refused to acknowledge the decision as legitimate and thus to enforce it. In doing 
so, he took a path previously trod by his predecessors in office who had fought to 
protect a President's right to disagree with the Supreme Court and avoid compliance 
with it, if at all possible. There were, however, no adequate constitutional 
mechanisms available to solve secession. 
Another example of a constitutional crisis occurred in 1800 when Thomas 
Jefferson and Aaron Burr received the same number of votes in the Electoral 
College. While they (and their supporters) knew which had run as President and 
Vice President, and thus which should have been considered the victor in the 
presidential election, Burr's refusal to acknowledge the obvious forced the House of 
Representatives to resolve which of the two men was President. In making this 
decision, the House received no guidance from the Constitution or historical 
practices. While the House voted ultimately to designate Jefferson as President 
(after several attempts), the confusion, discord, and uncertainty generated by the tie 
vote in the Electoral College between the top two Republicans running in the 
election precipitated a movement to amend the Constitution, culminating in the 
Twelfth Amendment. 
It is telling that the Court has not been able to resolve political crises on its 
own. To begin with, judges lack the means to solve genuine political crises, and 
national political leaders are instrumental in helping to resolve judicial crises. On 
the few occasions when courts have triggered crises, judges have had to rely on the 
political process ultimately to resolve them. I can think of no judicial crisis that 
courts have settled on their own; For instance, it was not until all three institutions 
of the national government fell into line behind the Court's decision mandating the 
end of segregation in public schools, did the resistance break down. By then, Brown 
had gone for more than a decade without full implementation in the deep South. 
Even when courts have been called upon to resolve political crises, they have failed 
to do so. Dred Scott is the most spectacular example of such a failure; it exacerbated 
rather than helped to resolve the crisis over the future of slavery in the United States. 
Again, Dred Scott helped to push the political crisis over slavery into a 
constitutional crisis. 
Nor can I think of a political crisis that courts have resolved. When political 
crises have been resolved short of a constitutional crisis, it has not been by courts, 
but by political leaders operating within the Constitution's intricate system of checks 
and balances. Political crises are resolved through accommodations however 
difficultly achieved through existing constitutional mechanisms. In other words, 
political crises can be resolved by political leaders who struggle amongst themselves 
until a political rather than a judicial solution is achieved. Andrew Johnson and Bill 
Clinton did not challenge their impeachments in court, but rather they relied upon 
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the constitutional process to absolve them. The political ill will generated by the 
Alien and Sedition Acts ended not because of anything courts did, but rather 
because of the actions of national political leaders. President Lincoln's unilateral 
suspension of habeas corpus was undoubtedly a dubious act, which Chief Justice 
Taney condemned as lawless; however, its ratification by Congress very shortly 
thereafter clarified its legal basis even if the ratification did not fully resolve the 
political fallout. 
The fact that Congress ratified Lincoln's action was not of course the end of 
the matter. The fact that Congress and the President ultimately joined together to 
support suspension of habeas corpus illustrates another kind of political crisis that 
has the distinct potential to transform into a constitutional crisis. This situation 
arises when national authorities join together to retaliate against some relatively 
defenseless segment of the population. This situation entails, in other words, a 
conflict between national authorities on one side and a relatively powerless 
constituency or group on the other. A prime example of such a conflict is the 
internment of Japanese Americans in World War II. Federal military and political 
leaders put together the internment plan with little or no evidence in support, but the 
Supreme Court ratified it in a closely divided opinion. With political and judicial 
authorities unified against them, the incarcerated Japanese Americans had no 
recourse left-the Constitution was literally of no avail to them until well after the 
war. A 1980 Act of Congress established a Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Internment of Civilians to study the Japanese relocation during World War II. The 
Commission concluded: 
The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 [which the Court had upheld in 
Korematsu] was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which 
followed from it [were] not driven by analysis of military conditions. The 
broad historical causes which shaped [the exclusion decisions] were race 
prejudice, war hysteria, and the failure of political leadership. [A] grave 
injustice was done. 
In 1984, a federal district court relied on the Commission's findings in granting a 
writ of coram nobis and vacating the conviction of Fred Korematsu, the original 
defendant in Korematsu. In 1988, President Reagan signed legislation formally 
acknowledging injustices imposed by the internment and providing for the payment 
of reparations. It is conceivable that in the framework I have suggested that the 
exclusion and internment of Japanese Americans constitute a constitutional crisis 
because clearly the Constitution provided no adequate mechanism to protect the 
Japanese Americans on the West Coast from the "historical causes" cited by the 
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. More precisely, 
the lapses and failures that led to the exclusion and internment of Japanese 
Americans during World War II could be understood as a crisis in which national 
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political, military, and judicial authorities joined together to deprive them a 
constitutional remedy for the damage done to them. 
Contrary to the protestations of many law professors, Bush v. Gore was not a 
crisis in constitutional law. The case involved a conflict between federal and state 
judicial authorities, but there was never a question of which of these authorities 
reigned supreme. Once the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Gore, the debate was 
not about whether the Supreme Court could overturn a state court judgment (settled 
since Martin v. Hunter's Lessee), but rather whether the Court exercised its lawful 
authority properly in the facts of this case. Even at the time the decision came 
down, roughly half the country and almost all political authorities largely fell behind 
it. Subsequent developments, particularly the war against terrorism, have increased 
the odds against political retaliation against the Court for its decision. 
While the Watergate tapes case clearly weakened the political opposition to 
Nixon's impeachment, it would be wrong to think that it resolved the political 
conflict between Nixon and Congress. As Gerald Gunther suggested, democratic 
institutions were proceeding methodically to deal with Nixon's misconduct without 
waiting for judicial support. Moreover, he suggested that this fact indicates there 
was no genuine crisis provoked by the movement to impeach Nixon. Had Nixon not 
resigned, there is every indication that he would not only have been impeached, but 
there would also have been little doubt the Senate would have convicted and 
removed him. The impeachment effort against Nixon had a momentum separate 
from the judicial process. 
The Jefferson Administration's attempted employment of the impeachment 
power to create vacancies in the federal judiciary posed a different kind of political 
crisis. It did not just begin, simply enough, from one judicial decision (or one 
judge's actions), but rather the crass desire to use impeachment to get rid of"unfit" 
judges apparently defined in such a manner as to apply only to Federalist judges. 
This use of impeachment came to an end when the House impeached, but the Senate 
acquitted, Associate Justice Samuel Chase for various acts, including assisting 
prosecutions of Republicans for violating the Alien and Sedition Acts passed with 
the backing of the Adams Administration. Chase's impeachment was a political 
crisis because it threatened to transform impeachment power into a mechanism to 
unseat a Justice for actions that could be remedied on appeal. It was a political 
crises because judicial independence hung in the balance, but it was resolved by 
political will. 
It is tempting to perceive the New Deal as not fitting within the pattern of 
political crises I have sketched. It is possible that, by taking a more deferential 
stance toward progressive economic reform, the Court helped to defuse the brewing 
controversy or crisis between it and national political authorities. There are, 
however, two reasons this view is mistaken. First, there is every reason to think that 
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the political institutions would have dealt with prolonged judicial resistance to the 
New Deal. In time, President Roosevelt's appointees would surely have dominated 
the Court, at which point the Court would have shifted its positions on economic due 
process and the scope ofCongress's Commerce Clause Power. Second, there is still 
reason to think that the Court backed down under enormous political pressure not 
just from the Court-packing plan, but also Roosevelt's overwhelming reelection in 
1936 and the mid-term elections of 1938. It is credible to think that one pivotal 
Justice, Owen Roberts, was convinced to shift his position on economic due process 
because of the signals sent by Roosevelt's landslide reelection based in part on his 
campaign against the Court. 
When the Court makes mistakes, we should keep in mind the Court's fate will 
likely depend more on the Constitution outside the Court than on anything the Court 
does. The structure of the Constitution provides the means by which the political 
branches can correct (or at least try to correct what they regard as) judicial errors. 
The Constitution provides a wide variety of mechanisms that they have used to 
redress or retaliate against the Court's mistakes. We saw how quickly political 
leaders reacted to correct what they perceived as the error of Chisholm v. Georgia. 
In the aftermath of Roe we have seen presidents deride the decision, call for its 
overruling, support legislation designed to weaken it, and seek to appoint justices 
who would overturn (or at least severely limit) it; members of Congress, particularly 
senators, question its legitimacy and propose both amendments and different kinds 
of jurisdictional limits to overturn or limit the damage of the decision; and at least 
four justices are prepared to overrule Roe. In other words, the critical response to 
Roe has fastidiously tracked constitutional procedures. 
The impact of the constitutional structure is evident from a survey of the 
political crises generated by the electoral disputes of 1800, 1824, and 1876. In 
1800, national leaders were vexed at the omissions of the original Constitution, and 
their solution was to change the Constitution. In 1824, the failure of any of the 
major presidential candidates to get a majority of electoral votes led to a proceeding 
in the House in which Andrew Jackson claimed John Quincy Adams entered into a 
"corrupt bargain" with Henry Clay to steal the election. Jackson took his case to the 
American people, who heard his message and overwhelmingly elected him to the 
presidency in 1828. In that circumstance, there was no need to change the 
Constitution, because it provided the political means by which Jackson could seek 
redress. In 1876, there were serious questions about the outcomes of close votes in 
some states (including Florida), forcing the House back into the position to resolve 
the disputes. Relying on the constitutional language empowering each chamber of 
Congress to adopt appropriate procedures to implement their respective authorities, 
the House appointed a special commission, which rendered a rather dubious opinion 
about how disputed electoral votes should be counted. Samuel Tilden graciously 
accepted the commission's vote, while Rutherford B. Hayes agreed to serve only 
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one term as a means to quiet discontent over the decision. Hayes agreed further to 
cut a deal with Southern Democrats to end Reconstruction in exchange for their not 
challenging further the commission decision. There was nothing extra-constitutional 
about these measures. 
To the contrary, these informal agreements were arranged within the checks 
and balances set forth in the Constitution. A genuine constitutional crisis was 
ultimately averted because the checks and balances of the Constitution proved 
adequate to force the disputants in a political crisis into a peaceful resolution of their 
conflict. Political crises present prime opportunities to measure the extent to which 
the Constitution's checks and balances can force parties into accommodations. 
When the parties to a dispute make recourse to existing constitutional mechanisms 
to resolve their differences, there is plainly no constitutional crisis. When the parties 
are unable to work out their differences through existing checks and balances, a 
constitutional crisis is likely to ensue. 
The dynamic in a genuine constitutional crisis is, however, radically different 
from those of judicial and political crises. It is here that the limits of written 
constitutionalism have been not only reached but also exceeded. This is the rare 
circumstance in which the contending parties recognize that the Constitution 
provides no answer to their dispute or even the means, as it exists at the time of their 
dispute, by which to resolve it. 
Consider, again, the example of secession. The contending sides clearly had 
their respective arguments, many of which were claimed to have been grounded in 
the Constitution or some authoritative source of constitutional meaning. The 
difficulty was that the sides could not agree on how, or even whether, the 
Constitution provided the means by which to resolve their different views on the 
constitutionality or legitimacy of secession. Secession was the culmination of the 
failure of either political or judicial authorities to settle the legitimacy and future of 
slavery on then existing constitutional terms. There simply was no common or 
middle ground left for the major disputants to settle their fundamentally different 
visions of the Constitution, including the nation's and states' respective authorities 
under it. The middle ground of course would have to have been something 
grounded in or consistent with the Constitution, but none was ever found. Hence, it 
is only in the rare circumstance of a constitutional crisis, as I have defined it, that the 
Constitution is of no avail. And that is precisely the point, for the crisis is the 
anxiety and conflict generated by the recognition that the Constitution cannot, and 
does not, solve the crisis facing the country. 
The fourth and final set of developments after Meese's speech that I wish to 
consider has to do with another forum, outside the Court, in which the Constitution 
figures prominently. Here, I refer to the significance and quality of public discourse 
about the Constitution. My concern here is with citizens' talk about the 
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Constitution. People discuss the Constitution at home, in school, and at work. The 
Constitution is also discussed in newspapers and on television, radio, and the 
Internet. No one has measured the quality or extent of this discussion, but surely it 
helps to give substance and shape to public attitudes reflected in polling and in 
social norms that guide public policy. 
My own profession contributes significantly to this discourse, though its 
contributions are not without problems. The problems are evident in two 
developments in how constitutional theorists treat the Constitution. I consider these 
important because nowhere outside the Court is the Constitution more frequently 
debated, analyzed, and probed than the halls of legal academia. 
The first development of note is the growing skepticism of constitutional 
theorists that the federal judiciary serves a meaningful counter-majoritarian function. 
For example, one problem with the structure of our federal courts, particularly the 
Supreme Court, is that as an institution it is not sufficiently insulated from the 
problem of partisan entrenchment. By the problem of partisan entrenchment, I mean 
the risk that a President can appoint a number of justices who will serve on the Court 
long after the President that appointed them has left office, the political party whose 
views they reflect might have lost political favor, and the people of the United States 
perhaps have concluded that they would prefer for justices to reflect different views 
on the Constitution. Recall that John Marshall was the last Federalist appointed to 
the Supreme Court. He served on the Court long after his Federalist Party expired, 
and to his critics, sought to advance, through his rulings, the long discredited views 
ofhis long dead party. Recall further after Roosevelt and Truman appointed eleven 
justices between them, the New Deal outlook they each reflect had perhaps become 
antiquated. We are, however, stuck with the justices in spite of these changes. 
The attack on the Court as a genuinely counter-majoritarian difficulty also 
takes another tack. Several scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court is not 
necessarily a counter-majoritarian institution, in that its decisions largely, if not 
almost entirely, track majoritarian sentiments and preferences. The presumption of 
these scholars is that constitutional decision making outside the courts exercises a 
significant degree of influence over the functioning of the Supreme Court. It might 
be instructive to examine in greater detail the form and content of such 
constitutional discourse. 
The second noteworthy development relates to the objective of constitutional 
scholarship. Just what is its purpose? This is not merely an academic question. For 
it comes up not just here but in confirmation hearings, like those held last week for 
one of your next distinguished visitors Michael McConnell, whom President Bush 
nominated to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Throughout 
his hearings, McConnell was pressed to explain how his strong criticism of some 
prominent Supreme Court precedents, particularly Roe v. Wade, could be reconciled 
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with his obligation as a federal judge not to have prejudged the questions likely to 
come before him. He was pressed hard to reconcile with his duties as a judge his 
praise for a lower court judge's refusal to abide by the Court's decision in Roe v. 
Wade. He suggested in response that his praise had been given with tongue in 
cheek, and that in fact it was intended as a mild rebuke. More generally, he 
acknowledged that on some issues his thinking had evolved while on many others he 
had taken provocative positions because that is how the academic game is played, it 
is how to make a name for oneself and provoke further discussion. 
Without disagreeing with soon-to-be Judge McConnell, I suggest that his 
provocative scholarship is also a major, even perhaps the major, reason for his 
nomination to a federal court of appeals. When another federal appellate court 
nominee suggested his provocative comments before the Federalist Society were not 
necessarily reflective of his genuine views on the subject on which he was 
commenting-the Commerce Clause-his answer seemed rather disingenuous. For 
there can be no doubt that the comments themselves got the attention of the people 
in the White House, which nominated him to his current position. 
The distancing of nominees from their writings raises some serious questions. 
I hasten to add that it is natural and laudatory for a person's views and thinking to 
evolve over time, not unlike James Madison who moved from opposing the National 
Bank early in his career to accepting it as President of the United States. That is not 
bad company to keep. It is especially important that a judge be capable not just of 
self-criticism but open to differing views and to having those views shape his own 
thinking on the issues that come before him. But the distancing nevertheless raises 
questions about what the purpose of constitutional theorizing is and particularly how 
other people are to rely on it. 
The conventional view is that theorists had at least two missions. The first 
was to speak the truth, i.e., simply to probe and analyze the issues as thoroughly as 
they could and call them as they saw them. The second was to speak truth to power, 
i.e., to give to governing authorities the theorists' best thinking on the subject in 
question. Yet another mission that has been undertaken with increasing zeal over the 
years has been advocacy, i.e., writing an article or book that effectively serves as a 
brief for one side or another on an important question of constitutional law. Yet, 
Professor McConnell's comments suggest still other missions. One seems to be 
either to entertain or amuse, perhaps with some instructive objective in mind. One 
objective seems to be provocative, not for the sake of clarifying the truth or speaking 
truth to power, but merely to get ahead, merely for self-aggrandizement. When one 
reads an article, say, by Professor McConnell or anyone else for that matter, it is 
hard now to know how seriously to take them. Should judges be prepared to rely on 
seemingly meticulous research in an article or should they or their clerks check the 
research on their own now, because they can no longer be sure whether the person 
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writing the article had some undisclosed objective, no longer believes what he or she 
wrote, or merely was trying to dazzle others with his or her intelligence. 
My objective, I hasten to add, is not to quarrel with Professor McConnell. I 
not only have supported his nomination to the federal court of appeals, but also 
genuinely feel he is one of the most thoughtful, honest, diligent, and respectable 
scholars of his generation. I have no doubts whatsoever that he will prove to be a 
credit to the federal bench. I also feel that his path to the federal court of appeals 
requires us to reconsider how we talk about the Constitution outside the Court. In 
particular, it requires, I think, that we need to clarify the objective of our 
commentary. So, in closing, I want to remind you that my comments tonight have 
been intended solely for the purpose of provoking further thought about one of the 
most under appreciated dimensions of constitutional law, constitutional discourse 
undertaken outside the Supreme Court. Tonight is a wonderful example of how 
such discourse may be undertaken with great civility, tolerance, perhaps a little 
humor, and a lot of attention. Thank you. 

